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COMPLEMENTARY NARRATIVE COMMENTARIES OF STATUTORY 
ACCOUNTS IN ANNUAL REPORTS OF UK LISTED COMPANIES 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper, for the first time, classifies narrative information into complementary and 
supplementary. For the purpose of the paper, complementary narrative information is defined 
as that information which refers to specific numbers presented in the statutory accounts (profit 
and loss and balance sheet). Non-specific narrative information is classified as supplementary. 
Having made the distinction and provided reasons for such a distinction the paper investigates 
the extent of complementary narrative commentaries on numbers from the statutory accounts. 
The paper also investigates which company-specific characteristics are associated with the 
extent of complementary narrative commentaries. An index consisting of 46 items which must 
be reported in the statutory accounts was used to measure the extent of complementary 
narrative commentaries in the annual reports of 170 listed UK companies. The findings suggest 
that, on average, the companies comment on 39.9% of the numbers appearing in their statutory 
accounts. Using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model, the results indicate that 
company size, gearing, profitability, liquidity ratio, the presence of exceptional items, and 
substantial institutional investment are significantly associated with the extent of 
complementary narrative commentaries. However, auditor type, directors’ share ownership, 
and the proportion of non-executive to executive directors are not significantly associated with 
the extent of complementary narrative commentaries. The research has important implications 
for accounting regulators, users of annual reports and future research into the usefulness 
narrative information provided in annual reports. 
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 COMPLEMENTARY NARRATIVE COMMENTARIES OF STATUTORY 
ACCOUNTS IN ANNUAL REPORTS OF UK LISTED COMPANIES 
 
1. Introduction 
The value of narrative information to users of annual reports is well documented in 
accounting literature (see, for example, Beattie, 1999; Rutherford, 2002, Beattie, McInnes and 
Fearnley, 2004). Previous studies in the UK (e.g., Lee and Tweedie, 1981; Bartlett and Chandler, 
1997) show that narrative sections of annual reports, including the chairman’s statement are the 
most read by both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. Empirical research using US and 
Canadian data shows similar results. For example, Abrahamson and Amir (1996) documented that 
information provided in the president’s letter was useful in identifying firms with better than 
expected future performances. Rodgers and Grant (1997) found that the Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A) section of annual reports provides the largest proportion of information 
cited by sell-side analysts in their reports, constituting almost twice as much information as basic 
financial statements. Additionally, Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1999) revealed that MD&A 
sections of reports are a source of both new and useful information to sell-side financial analysts, 
suggesting that narrative information is important to sophisticated users. Similarly, Barron and 
Kile (1999) also found that high quality MD&A disclosures are associated with less error and 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
Accounting narratives have also been found to be useful in predicting bankruptcy. For 
example, Tennyson, Ingram and Dugan (1990) and Smith and Tafler (2000) investigated the 
relevance of accounting narratives in predicting company failure and found that narrative are 
useful in predicting which companies would fail. Efforts of regulatory authorise both in the US 
and UK also illustrate the importance of accounting narratives. The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC, 2002), for example, extended disclosure requirements in the MD& A section 
because it was felt that such information is useful to users of the annual report. In the context of 
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 the UK, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) advocated for mandatory Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR). Consequently, the ASB’s 2005 reporting standard OFR was made a 
mandatory under Statutory Instrument (S.I. 2005/1011). However, this was repealed by the 
Companies Act 1985 (OFR) (Repeal) Regulations 2005. Further importance of narratives is 
evident from the requirements of the European Union Accounts Modernisation Directive (EU 
AMD, 2003) which now incorporates most of the information formerly required by ASB 
(2005). The increasing proportion of the UK annual reports dedicated to narrative information 
is a further reflection of the increasing importance of narratives. A survey by Arthur Andersen 
in 1996 and 2001, for example, found that a large proportion of annual report pages dedicated to 
narrative disclosures increased from 45% in 1996 to 57% in 2001.  
This objective of this paper is to examine the extent of complementary narrative 
commentaries in annual reports of UK listed companies. The study also seeks to determine 
which company specific characteristics are associated with the extent of complementary 
narrative commentaries. We focus on complementary narrative information mainly because it 
is relatively easier to check its presence or absence by referring to financial statements 
compared to supplementary information. 
According to ASB (2006) narrative information reported in the OFR should complement 
as well as supplement the financial statements, in order to enhance the overall corporate 
disclosure (emphasis added). This suggests that narrative information play either a 
complementary or supplementary role to the financial statements. What is complementary or 
supplementary narrative information is, however, not defined by ASB (2006). Indeed previous 
studies (e.g., Beattie, 1999, Rutherford, 2002) do not make a distinction between 
complementary and supplementary information’. We therefore, propose to formally classify 
narrative information into complementary and supplementary. We define complementary 
narrative information as that information that refers to specific accounting numbers presented 
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 in the financial statements. The objective of such information is to inform the reader why such 
numbers are lower, the same or higher compared to the previous period. Our definition is 
consistent with Cole and Jones (2005) who suggest that complementary information should 
clarify the information provided in the financial statements by providing explanations for, and 
data related to changes in revenue and expenses. Understanding why there has been an increase 
or decrease to items in the financial statements could be helpful for investment decision-
making. For example, explaining changes in revenue and profits may assist investors in 
anticipating future revenue and profits as well as providing a picture on whether current trends 
will persist. Complementary narrative information in annual reports also helps investors; 
particularly the unsophisticated understand the company results presented in financial 
statements. Evidence from different countries that suggest that unsophisticated ordinary 
shareholders do not understand financial statements ( see for example, Lee and Tweedie (1976) 
and Bartlett and Chandler (1997) in the UK, Klassen and Schreuder (1981) in the Netherlands, 
Wilton and Tabb (1978) in New Zealand and Anderson (1979) and Courtis (1982) in Australia 
suggest that the problem transcends national boundaries.  
On the other hand, we define supplementary narrative information as additional narrative 
information that does not refer to specific accounting numbers presented in financial statements. 
This includes non-specific narrative information on future prospects, company’s strategy, and 
operating environment. Accordingly, to distinguish the two types of narrative information it is 
important to ask whether a word, phrase or sentence or paragraph is describing a specific figure 
that is presented in the financial statements. If the answer to that is yes then that information is 
complementary and if the answer is no then the information is supplementary. Although, 
supplementary information is non-specific it is still important in assisting investment decision 
process (Wilson and Allison-Koerber, 1992; Milne and Chan, 1999).  
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 We believe that this study, which makes a distinction of narrative information for the first 
time, is important to accounting policy makers, users of annual reports and for future research. 
First, narrative information is currently less regulated than financial statements. A possible reason 
is the difficulty in legislating for reporting of narrative information and enforcing compliance. 
Given that complementary narrative information refers to specific numbers in the financial 
statements, regulating such information and enforcing compliance should be easier than the case 
with supplementary information. For example, it is easier for accounting regulators to require 
complementary narrative commentary of material changes to turnover, profits, and long term 
loans and enforce because this can easily be checked. However, it is more difficult to legislate to 
enforce supplementary information such as company strategy; future plans etc and enforce 
compliance because there is no way of checking such information. Second, the availability of 
more complementary narrative information will benefit unsophisticated users who do not 
understand financial statements and rely on management interpretation of financial results for an 
appreciation of company performance. Sophisticated users such as analysts will also benefit as 
they try to understand factors affecting current performance in order to predict future results. 
Finally, we also believe that the study is important as it may form the basis of future accounting 
research that could lead to improvements in the quality of financial reporting. For example, the 
distinction should lead to research into the relative usefulness of narrative complementary and 
supplementary information.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The following section discusses the 
environment of complementary narrative commentaries.  Section 3 examines the theoretical 
framework of complementary narrative commentaries and develops the hypotheses to be tested. 
This is followed in section 4 by a discussion of data and research methods. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the research results. Finally, Section 6 provides summary and concluding remarks.  
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 2.  Narrative Commentaries in the UK 
This section discusses the complementary narrative reporting environment in UK. 
However, as will become clear, it is always not possible to determine whether the requirements 
are for complementary or supplementary narrative information. This is because the existing 
legislation or recommendations do not recognise the distinction between complementary and 
supplementary narrative information. Our analysis of the legislation and recommendations 
should, however, be of some help in understanding to what extent companies are currently 
required to report complementary and supplementary information. The analysis should provide 
a context in which the results of the study are seen and interpreted.  
There are various requirements in terms of reporting of narrative information in general. 
For example, The UK Companies Act (CA) 1985, requires ‘a fair review of the development of 
the business of the company and its subsidiaries during the year and their position at the end of the 
year’ [Sec 234 (1) (a)]. What is ‘fair review’ is open to interpretation by company management 
since it is not defined by the Act. Arguably a fair review of business would include discussion of 
the results which may include turnover and profits. To the extent that managers decide to discuss 
such figures as they appear in financial statements that would constitute complementary narrative 
commentary. The CA 85 also requires that ‘the amount (if any) that directors recommend should 
be paid as dividend must be stated [s 234 (1)(b)] in the directors’ report. Since the dividends 
recommended are also included in the financial statements we believe that this requirement relates 
to complementary narrative information. Finally, CA 85 also requires that differences between the 
market value of land held by the company or the group should be disclosed in the directors’ 
report, if in the opinion of the directors the difference is such of a significance that it should be 
brought to shareholders’ or debenture holders attention [7 sch 1 (2)]. Such a requirement is in our 
opinion complementary information assuming that the discussion relates to the value of land that 
is stated in the balance sheet. 
                                                                                                                                                           6
 Under the European Union Accounts Modernisation Directive (EU AMD, 2003) companies 
are now required to produce an ‘enhanced directors’ report’ incorporating a Business Review. The 
EU AMD (2003) requires that the Business Review should be a balanced and comprehensive 
analysis of the development, performance, and position of the company at the end of the year. 
Under the EU AMD (2003) regulations the review must include analysis using financial key 
performance indicators (KPI). The regulations do not say how many KPIs should be included, nor 
mandate any particular KPIs for companies to report on. The selection and number of KPIs 
included in the review is for directors to decide (Trucost, 2006).  
Complementary narrative commentary has also been the subject a number of a number of 
previous pronouncements by the ASB1.  1n 2005, the ASB issued Reporting Standard (RS) 1 
under its then legal powers to make standards for the OFR ('The Reporting Standards 
(Specified Body) Order 2005' (SI 2005 No. 692)). The legal requirements for the OFR were set 
out in 'The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors' Report etc.) 
Regulations, 2005' (SI 2005 No. 1011). However, the legal nature of the OFR was short lived 
since it was repealed by 'The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review) (Repeal) 
Regulations 2005 (SI 2005 No. 3442) which came into effect in January 2006. Following these 
developments the ASB converted RS 1 to a Reporting Statement which means that companies 
can still comply with the statement on a voluntary basis. The RS states that the OFR, where, 
relevant should provide additional explanations of amounts recorded and explain the conditions 
and events that shaped the information contained in the financial statements. The statement 
also suggests that the OFR should contain an analysis of financial position of the company. 
The analysis whilst based on financial statements, should comment on the events that have 
impacted the financial position of the entity during the financial year, and future factors that 
are likely to affect the financial position going forward. Finally, the RS also recommends that 
                                                 
1 For example, The Operating and Financial Review (OFR) issued 1993 and revised 2003. 
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 the OFR should discuss the entity’s current and prospective liquidity. Where relevant, this 
should include commentary on the level of borrowing.  
 
3.  Theoretical Framework & Hypotheses Development 
Given that complementary narrative commentaries of statutory accounts is largely 
voluntary, the extent of reporting such information might be driven by benefits and costs. Prior 
analytical research suggests that greater disclosure can help to correct a firm’s undervaluation 
(Verrecchia, 1990) and also to correct overvaluation to avoid potential litigation (Skinner, 
1994). Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggest that greater disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry, thereby improving liquidity and lowering the cost of capital. According to Ronen 
and Livnat (1981), voluntary information such as complementary narrative commentaries 
might be provided if managers believe this would increase the wealth or expected utility of 
shareholders. Milgron (1981) also argued that disclosure may occur to signal good news on the 
part of the company.  For example, managers reporting increased profits may wish to provide 
more complementary narrative commentaries to draw the attention of investors to increased 
profitability. Diamond (1985) showed analytically that firms will disclose information if it 
saves traders’ the cost of acquiring it on their own and if it improves risk sharing by making 
traders’ beliefs more homogeneous. Finally, Diamond and Verrechia (1991) linked disclosure 
such as that of complementary narrative commentaries to the cost of capital: revealing 
information to reduce information asymmetry can reduce a firm’s cost of capital by attracting 
increased demand from large investors due to increased liquidity of the firm’s securities.  
However, Verrecchia (1990) also argued that given agency problems, investors may view 
disclosures as non-credible and therefore reduce the value of a company. Additionally, greater 
disclosures could reduce shareholder value by revealing valuable information to competitors, 
particularly for companies operating in high-growth or concentrated product markets (Bamber 
                                                                                                                                                           8
 and Cheon, 1998). Therefore, to the extent that the benefits of complementary commentaries 
outweigh costs, managers are more likely to have incentives for additional complementary 
commentary on statutory accounts. 
Drawing from the literature, prior empirical studies demonstrate that disclosure practices 
are motivated by a number of factors such as agency-related costs (Botosan and Harris, 2000) 
and corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). This study draws from 
some of this literature to model the relationship between complementary narrative 
commentaries and company-specific variables. For convenience the variables are grouped into 
four categories, namely structure, performance, ownership, and governance related. According 
to Lang and Lundholm (1993), structural related variables (size and gearing) measure a firm’s 
characteristics which are widely known and likely to remain relatively stable over time, whilst 
performance variables (profitability, liquidity and exceptional items) are time-period specific, 
representing information to which management may have preferential access and is likely to be 
the subject of disclosure during the period. A further two categories proposed in this study 
relate to ownership (directors’ share ownership and substantial institutional investors) and 
governance (auditor type and the proportion of non-executive directors) of the company. 
Ownership is an important category, given that the ASB (1999) identified the objective of 
annual reports as being to provide information about the financial position and performance of 
a company useful to many users (primarily investors). The governance category is also 
important since significant results will indicate the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in 
ensuring the reporting of information available internally to outsiders. 
 
3.1 Structure-Related Variables 
The structure-related variables discussed are company size and gearing. A number of 
previous studies suggested reasons why company size may influence the extent of disclosure. 
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 These include the competitive advantage of large companies being less endangered by greater 
disclosure (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978); information costs (Firth, 1979); advice of well-qualified 
accounting staff and advisors; vulnerability of large firms to implicit and explicit government 
regulation (Gagnon, 1971); and political costs (Stigler, 1971). Others have also suggested that 
the complexity and operations of larger companies suggest they are likely to have sophisticated 
information systems for managerial control as well as the needs of creditors (Cooke, 1991). For 
similar reasons it is expected that large companies may provide more complementary narrative 
commentary of statutory accounts numbers than smaller companies. 
The expectation of a relationship between gearing and complementary narrative 
commentary of statutory  accounts is based on the theory that predicts higher agency costs for 
firms with proportionally more debt in their capital structures (e.g. Smith and Warner, 1979). 
Higher levels of complementary narrative commentary assure long-term creditors that 
management and shareholders are less likely to diminish claims accruing from bond covenants 
and thus reduce agency costs (Myres, 1971). In the absence of such assurances, long-term 
creditors may decide to price-protect themselves by demanding higher rates of return (Chow, 
1982). However, Zarzeski (1996) argued that companies with high gearing tend to share more 
private information with creditors due to well-developed banking relationships which may 
result in less, rather than more, disclosure. El-Gazzar, Finn and Jacob (1999) also suggested 
that low-geared companies may disclose more rather than less information because they tend to 
depend on equity financing which could encourage greater disclosure to meet investor demands 
for information. Empirical evidence of the relationship between disclosure and gearing is 
similarly mixed. Malone, Fries and Jones (1993) found a significant positive relationship but 
Schwartz and Soo (1996) found a significant negative relationship, whilst others (e.g.Wallace 
and Naser, 1995) found no significant relationship. Given the mixed results from previous 
studies, no directional prediction of the relationship between gearing and complementary 
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 narrative commentary is made in this study. Based on the above literature, it is hypothesised 
that:  
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between company size and the extent of complementary 
narrative commentary of statutory accounts. 
H2: There is a relationship between gearing and the extent of complementary narrative 
commentary of statutory accounts. 
 
3.2 Performance-Related Variables 
 The three performance-related variables are profitability, liquidity ratio and the presence 
of exceptional items. Previous studies (e.g. Buzby, 1975) have suggested that higher rates of 
return motivate management to disclose detailed information in order to support continuance of 
their positions and compensation. Signalling theory also suggests that more profitable 
companies are more likely to disclose more information to signal to the market their superior 
performance (see Akerlof, 1970) and differentiate themselves from poor performers. In the 
context of complementary narrative commentary, profitable companies are expected to provide 
extensive commentary on a number of indicators, such as profit before and after tax, dividends 
and earnings per share, to highlight their achievements compared to companies reporting 
declining profitability. 
 Liquidity ratio is also expected to be associated with complementary narrative 
commentary because company managers who have high liquidity ratios have nothing to hide 
from users of financial statements (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978). Such companies may also 
volunteer complementary narrative commentary to counter allegations that their high liquidity 
position may be a sign of poor working capital management. In contrast, management of 
companies with low liquidity ratios may fear that by volunteering complementary narrative 
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 commentary of their liquidity positions, short-term creditors may demand immediate payment. 
This is because the ability of a firm to meet its short-term financial obligations without having 
to liquidate its long-term assets or cease operation is an important factor in interested parties 
such as investors, lenders and regulatory authorities evaluating it (Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
When a company is unable to pay its current liabilities (interest and capital) this is to the 
detriment of the lender who may in turn start bankruptcy proceedings.  
 Financial Reporting Standard (FRS 3, para. 5) defines exceptional items as ‘material 
items which derive from events or transactions that fall within the ordinary activities of the 
reporting entity and which individually or, if of similar type, in aggregate, need to be disclosed 
by virtue of their size or incidence if the financial statements are to give a true and fair view’. 
The presence of such items in the financial statements is likely to motivate management to 
provide some complementary narrative commentary as to the reason why they arose. Failure to 
provide commentary could result in investor uncertainty about the prospects of the company 
which may result in volatility of its share price. Based on the above literature, it is hypothesised 
that:  
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between profitability and the extent of complementary 
narrative commentary of statutory accounts. 
H4: There is a positive relationship between liquidity and the extent of complementary 
narrative commentary of statutory accounts. 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the presence of exceptional items and the extent of 
complementary narrative commentary of statutory accounts. 
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3.3 Ownership-Related Variables 
Executive directors’ share ownership has been linked to differences in disclosure levels because 
agency costs are associated with an increasing level of non-owner management in a firm 
(Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman, 1981). Provision of additional information to the principals 
(shareholders) about the outcomes of management (directors) decisions made by the agent on the 
principals’ behalf reduces agency costs (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). The rationale of this 
argument is that the marginal cost to management for providing additional information may be 
much lower than the cost to individual equity holders in ascertaining the same information. This is 
particularly so in the case of individual equity shareholders trying to ascertain the reasons for 
changes in financial performance and the position of the company from the statutory accounts. 
Complementary narrative commentary of changes from the previous year in an annual report will 
save individual investors the cost of ascertaining such information. The predicted relationship is 
negative because the conflict between shareholders and directors increases as the percentage of 
share capital held by directors decreases (e.g. Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith, 1982).  
 In the UK, a substantial investor is any person or organisation holding 3 percent or more of 
the share capital. UK institutional investors – primarily pension funds and life insurance 
companies – are key participants in UK equity markets, controlling around 45% of quoted 
investments (Myers, 2000). Institutions as major equity holders are potentially able to play a key 
role in determining corporate policy and incentive structures, including the patterns of hiring, 
firing and remunerating both executive and non-executive directors (e.g. Agrawal and Mandelker, 
1990). This may include regular requests for information from company management which may 
not be cost-effective from a managerial point of view. This may result in managers providing more 
complementary narrative information in annual reports. There are, however, reasons for believing 
that the potential for institutional involvement may not be fulfilled, not least because the private 
cost of such intervention may yield private benefits which are less than the public good they will 
                                                                                                                                                           13
 produce (Cosh, Hughes and Singh, 1989). If the role that institutional investors choose to play is 
passive, exercising ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’, then their influence may not lead to greater 
complementary narrative disclosure levels. Based on the above arguments, the following 
hypotheses will be tested: 
 
H6: There is a negative relationship between executive directors’ share ownership and the 
extent of complementary narrative commentary of statutory accounts. 
H7: There is a positive relationship between substantial institutional investors and the extent of 
complementary narrative commentary of statutory accounts. 
 
3.4 Governance-Related Variables 
Previous studies have suggested that the extent of disclosure by firms may vary because of 
differences in the independent auditors (e.g. Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse, 1990). Malone 
et al. (1993) suggested that the rationale behind this is the expectation that smaller audit firms (non 
big-five) are often sensitive to client demands because of economic consequences. Based on this 
reasoning, Wallace and Naser (1995, p. 326) suggested that bigger, independent audit firms are 
less likely than smaller independent ones to depend on (or have a bonding relationship with) one 
or a few clients. The lack of bonding with clients would enable big independent audit firms to 
demand greater disclosure detail in annual reports of their clients (see also Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983).  
A number of the most influential suggestions for the reform of corporate governance are 
built around the influence and role of non-executive directors (Charkham, 1994). Non-executive 
directors provide advice to corporate boards on strategic decisions, which may improve economic 
and financial performance (Fama, 1980). Specifically, a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors on corporate boards would result in more effective monitoring and limit managerial 
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 opportunism (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Since non-executive directors should be independent 
(Higgs Report, 2003), they may be inclined to encourage managers to become more responsive to 
investors’ information needs. The inclusion of non-executive directors on boards will improve a 
firm’s compliance with disclosure requirements which in turn will enhance the comprehensiveness 
and quality of disclosure (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005). Chen and Jaggi (2000) examined whether 
a higher proportion of non-executive directors on corporate boards is associated with more 
comprehensive disclosure within the mandatory framework. Their results suggest a positive 
association between the proportion of non-executive directors on corporate boards of Hong Kong 
firms and comprehensiveness of financial disclosure. Based on the preceding discussion, the 
following other hypotheses will be tested: 
 
H8: There is a positive relationship between auditors (big-five) and the extent of 
complementary narrative commentary of statutory accounts. 
H9: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and the 
extent of complementary narrative commentary of statutory accounts. 
 
4. Data and Research Method 
4.1 Sample selection 
A sample of 200 out of all 1115 UK non-financial companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange was randomly selected. Financial companies were excluded from the population of 
listed companies before sampling because they are required to provide additional disclosures 
by other regulatory bodies (Tauringana, 1997; Mangena and Pike, 2005). The latest annual 
reports as at 31 December 2002 were requested.  Eleven companies did not respond and 
subsequent efforts to find their annual reports, including visits to company websites, were 
unsuccessful. Eight companies were eliminated because they had changed their accounting 
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 periods. This meant that their financial year was either shorter or longer than the rest which 
would have caused comparison problems. Six were removed because they had recently merged 
with other companies, while five letters were returned because addresses had been changed. 
The final sample consisted of 170 companies.  
  
4.2 Disclosure Index and Scoring Approach 
The complementary narrative commentary index consists of items which are required to be 
disclosed in statutory accounts (profit and loss and balance sheet) of annual reports in terms of 
the UK Companies Act 1985 and Accounting Standards and the London Stock Exchange (see 
appendix I). The annual reports were scored by awarding a 1 if a complementary narrative 
commentary of statutory accounts numbers was provided in the narrative parts of the annual 
report and 0 if it was not (e.g. Cooke, 1991). For example, if the narrative part of the annual 
report discussed the increase in turnover, the company would be awarded 1 and if not 0.  In the 
end the individual company score is determined by how many accounting numbers presented 
in the profit and loss account were discussed divided the maximum possible for the company. 
The maximum number of items possible may differ because particular numbers may not be 
relevant or disclosed in other companies’ annual reports. For example, for companies with no 
debt on their balance sheet, the item ‘interest payable’ will not appear in the P&L, and 
therefore the total possible for such a company will be reduced by the number of non-
applicable items. No weight was attached to take into account the usefulness of different items 
to different users. This is because prior studies (e.g., Mangena and Pike, 2005) show that there 
are no differences in the results between weighted and unweighted disclosures. According to 
Cooke (1992), companies that are good at disclosing useful items are equally good at 
disclosing less useful items. Unlike extant studies whereby a researcher needs to decide whether 
non-disclosure means the item is not applicable, there was no such problem in the case of the 
current research. This is because in the case of a complementary narrative commentary not being 
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 provided the statutory accounts were checked. If the item was included in the statutory accounts 
but there was no complementary narrative commentary in the narrative section, then the company 
was not awarded any mark. 
   
4.3 Estimating procedure  
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates were used to determine the influence 
of selected company variables on complementary narrative commentaries of statutory 
accounts. The following OLS regression estimation process is assumed to hold for the sample 
companies: 
 
CNCSJ = β0 + β1LNSIZEJ + β2 GEARJ + β3 PROFIT J + β4 LIQUIDJ  
  + β5  EXCEPTSJ  + β6 DIRSHAJ + β7  SUBINSTJ  
  + β8 AUDITJ + β9 PRONEDJ + EJ     
 
Where the dependent variable, CNCS J, is the complementary narrative commentary score (that 
is the score for each company divided by the maximum possible score), β0 is the intercept, ej 
the residual and the independent variables β1 to β9 and are defined in Table 1. 
 
 INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 The descriptive statistics of both the dependent and independent variables are  
presented in Table 2 showing the median, mean, standard deviation, minimum and  
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 maximum for the dependent and independent variables. The descriptive statistics of the 
complementary narrative commentary score (CNCS) show that the minimum is 0.00 which 
means that at least one company provided no commentary of the financial statement numbers. 
The mean score is 39.9% with a median of 42% suggest, on the face of it, that companies 
provide very little complementary narrative commentary on financial statements numbers. 
However, since this is the first study to investigate this it is difficult to say whether this level of 
complementary narrative commentary is sufficient for the information needs of users. The other 
consideration is that of materiality. Obviously companies can not be expected to provide 
narrative commentaries when the change to the financial statement numbers is immaterial.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.2 Correlation and Multicollinearity Analyses 
The Pearson product-moment coefficients for all variables are presented in Table 3 and 
show no high correlations among independent variables. This suggests that multicollinearity 
problems, which arise when there is a strong correlation between two or more predictors in a 
regression model, are unlikely. High levels of collinearity (0.8 or 0.9 according to Field, 2000) 
increase the probability that a good predictor of the outcome will be found to be insignificant 
and rejected from the model. As Table 3 indicates, there seems to be no serious problem of 
multicollinearity with the data. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
5.3 Results of multiple regression analysis 
The results of the OLS regression model2 are presented in Table 4. The results indicate 
that the model explains 61% of the variation in the quantity of complementary narrative 
                                                 
2 Various checks and tests were carried out to ensure that the assumptions of the model were not violated. These 
included heteroscedasticity, Kolmogrov-Smirnov, Cook’s distance, Durbin-Watson. The checks and tests all 
indicated that there were no serious violations of the model assumptions. 
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 commentary of statutory accounts. The results indicate that company size, gearing, profitability, 
liquidity, the presence of exceptional items and substantial institutional investors are all 
significant explanatory variables of the extent of complementary narrative commentary of 
statutory accounts. The positive t-values suggest that large companies, highly geared, more 
profitable, high liquidity, and those reporting exceptional items and those with substantial 
institutional investment provide more complementary narrative commentary than others. 
However, executive directors’ share ownership, auditor type and the proportion of non-
executive directors are not significant explanatory variables.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The significant association between company size and the extent of complementary 
narrative commentary of statutory accounts is consistent with previous research findings which 
found that size influence the extent of disclosure in general (e.g.Wallace, Naser and Mora, 
1994). This is also consistent with the notion that large companies are in the public eye and to 
satisfy their requirements they need to provide more information than smaller companies. The 
results also indicate that gearing is positively associated with the extent of complementary 
narrative commentary of statutory accounts, suggesting that high geared companies provide 
more commentary than low geared companies. This is consistent with previous research results 
reported by Malone et al (1993).  
The significant positive association between profitability and the extent of 
complementary narrative commentary of statutory accounts suggests that more profitable 
companies discuss more of the accounting numbers from the profit and loss account than less 
profitable companies to signal superior performance. This is consistent with the signalling 
theory which suggests that more profitable companies are more likely to signal to the market 
their superior performance. The findings are also consistent with previous research findings by 
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 Tauringana and Chong (2004) who found that company managers are more likely to comment 
on good performance compared to bad. Similarly, liquidity ratio results which show a positive 
association with extent of narrative complementary commentary are consistent with agency 
theory prediction that managers want to be seen in good light and will volunteer information if 
it shows them in good light. The results of the presence of exceptional items are consistent 
with the argument in the hypothesis which states that the presence of exceptional items 
motivates managers to comment because failure to do so would lead to investor uncertainty 
about the future prospects of the company. Finally, the significance of the relationship between 
substantial institutional investors and the extent of complementary narrative commentary is 
consistent with the argument by Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) that Institutions as major 
equity holders are potentially able to play key role in corporate disclosure policy. The results 
presented in this study suggest that substantial institutional investors may put pressure on 
company managers to provide more complementary narrative discussion in annual reports. 
 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
This study, for the first time, formally defined and classified narrative information into 
complementary and supplementary. Complementary narrative information is defined as that 
information which refers to specific numbers presented in the financial statements. On the other 
hand, supplementary information is defined as any other non-specific narrative information on 
matters such as future prospects, company’s strategy, and operating environment. Having made 
the distinction the paper investigated the extent of complementary narrative commentary of 
statutory accounts of UK listed companies, and also examined the association of the 
complementary narrative commentaries with company specific factors. The findings of the 
extent of complementary narrative commentary suggest that, on average, companies provided a 
commentary on 39.9% of the items found in the statutory accounts. Whilst, the level of 
complementary commentary seems low, it is difficult to make conclusive judgements for two 
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 reasons. First this study is only exploratory. Second, the issues of materiality were not 
addressed in the study.  The results also indicated that company size, gearing, profitability, 
liquidity ratio, substantial institutional investment, the presence of exceptional items determine 
the extent of complementary narrative commentary. Directors’ share ownership, auditor type 
and the proportion of non-executive directors were found not to have an influence on the extent 
of complementary narrative commentary of statutory accounts.  
We believe the study results are important to policy makers, users of annual reports and 
provide the basis for further research that may lead to improvement in the quality of financial 
reporting. The study is significant to policy makers because it distinguishes for the first time 
complementary from supplementary narrative information. The distinction is important because in 
our view it is relatively easier for policy makers to legislate for complementary narrative 
information and enforce compliance compared to supplementary narrative information. Given that 
our findings suggests that on average only 39.9% of the numbers in statutory accounts are 
commented on, accounting regulators may wish to legislate for more complementary narrative 
commentaries if future research find that complementary narrative commentaries are not sufficient 
for the information needs of users of the annual report. We also believe that this study, the first to 
focus on complementary narrative commentary, is important to unsophisticated shareholders who 
do not understand financial statements and have to rely on management complementary narrative 
commentaries. Sophisticated users such as investment analysts will also benefit as they try to 
understand factors affecting current results in order to predict future results. Finally, the study is 
important because future research suggested below may lead to improvements in the quality of 
financial reporting. 
There are a number of limitations which should be taken into account in the interpretation 
of the current results. First, the scoring procedure adopted is dichotomous. This means no 
account is taken of the comprehensiveness of complementary narrative commentary. This 
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 penalises those companies that provide more detailed discussion. However, a detailed review 
of literature indicated that there was no consensus on the best way to measure the amount of 
information. Given that the majority of studies on the extent of information disclosure have 
used the same scoring procedure it was deemed the best available method available. Second, in 
some cases there were difficulties in deciding what is complementary and supplementary. This 
problem was alleviated by independent scoring by authors and then discussing the differences 
until a satisfactory resolution was reached. Finally, the results reported in this paper are based 
on complementary narrative commentary of the statutory accounts rather than all financial 
statements which include the Statement of Total Recognised Gains and Losses (SORG) and the 
Cash Flow Statement. However, given the preliminary nature of the work it was necessary to 
limit the scope. 
The preliminary nature of the study suggests that more research is required. First, there is 
need for further research as to the validity of classifying narrative information into complementary 
and supplementary. Second, there is need for research into the relative usefulness of 
complementary narrative and supplementary narrative information to the users of annual reports. 
This is because if there is a difference in the usefulness of complementary and supplementary 
information there may be need for a rebalancing in favour of the information that is more useful. 
Finally, there is need for research to find out whether complementary narrative information is 
relatively easier to legislate and enforce compliance as we suggested in this paper. 
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Appendix I 
Complementary Narrative Commentary Scoring Sheet 
Company Name     _____________________________________________________ 
List of Items                                                                      
1. Turnover                                                                                                    ________                     
2. Cost of sales                             ________                                               
3. Gross profit                             ________    
4. Net operating expenses                                        ________  
5. Operating profit                                        ________  
6. Profit on sale of properties                                                                        ________     
7. Loss on sale of properties                                                                          ________ 
8. Provision for loss on operations to be discontinued                                  ________ 
9. Loss on disposal of discontinued operations                                      ________ 
10. Profit on disposal of discontinued operations                                            ________ 
11. Loss on ordinary activities before interest                                                 ________ 
12. Profit on ordinary activities before interest                                               ________ 
13. Interest payable                                                                                          ________ 
14. Interest receivable                                                                                      ________ 
15. Profit on ordinary activities before taxation                                               ________ 
16. Loss on ordinary activities before taxation                                                 ________ 
17. Tax on profit of ordinary activities                                                     ________ 
18. Profit on ordinary activities after taxation                                                   ________  
19. Loss on ordinary activities after taxation                                                     ________ 
20. Minority interests                                                                                         ________ 
21. Profit for the financial year                                                                          ________ 
22. Loss for the financial year                                                                            ________ 
23. Dividends                                                                                                     ________   
24. Retained profit for the financial year                                                           ________ 
25. Retained loss for the financial year                                                             ________ 
26. Earnings per share                                                                                        ________ 
27 Fixed assets (total)                                                                                       ________ 
28. Tangible fixed assets (total)                                                                         ________ 
29. Intangible fixed  (total)                                                                               ________ 
30. Current assets  (total)                                                                               ________ 
31. Stocks                                                                                             ________ 
32. Debtors                                                                                              ________ 
33. Cash at bank and in hand                                                                              ________ 
34. Prepayments                                                                                             ________ 
35. Creditors: amounts failing due within one year                                           ________ 
36. Provision for corporation tax                                                                        ________ 
37. Accrued charges                                                                                            ________ 
38. Bank overdraft                                                                                              ________ 
39. Net current assets                                                                                           ________ 
40. Total assets less current liabilities                                                                 ________ 
41. Creditors: amounts falling due after more than one year                              ________ 
42. Debentures                                                                                                     ________ 
43. Capital and reserves (total)                                                                    ________ 
44. Share capital                                                                                              ________ 
45. Share premium                                                                                              ________                                         
46. Accumulated profit and loss account                                                  ________  
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Table 1: Description of Variables 
Symbol Variable description Acronym 
and expected 
sign 
β1 Size of a company is measured by total assets expressed in £ 
millions. 
size     ( + ) 
β2 Gearing - long term debt divided by long term loans plus 
shareholders’ equity. 
gear    ( -/+ ) 
β3 Profitability - company's net profit before interest and tax 
divided by total assets. 
profit     ( + ) 
β4 Liquidity ratio - current assets divided by current liabilities. liquid    ( + )  
β5 Exceptional items - a dummy variable coded 1 if the reported 
exceptional items in its profit and loss account; 0 otherwise. 
excepts ( + ) 
β6 Directors share ownership - the percentage of voting shares 
owned or controlled by directors including any shares held on 
behalf of family members but excludes any shares held in trust. 
dirsha    ( - ) 
β7 Substantial institutional investors - the percentage of equity 
owned by substantial institutional investors. 
subinst  ( + ) 
β8 Large auditors -  a dummy variable coded as 1 if the 
company's auditor is a member of one of the "big five" firm of 
auditors; 0 otherwise. 
audit     ( + ) 
β9 Non-executive directors - the number of non-executive directors 
divided by the total number of all directors on the company's 
board of directors. 
proned   ( + ) 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable  Obs Meadian            Mean        Std. Dev.      Min   Max 
Cncs  170      .42      .399           .151   .00            .82 
Size 170      95527  675023 1854097  731.00 16278000 
Gear 170      .26      .284         .209  .00           .92 
Profit  170      .0993      .085         .105 -.43           .36 
Liquid 170    1.395    1.509         .765  .24         4.15 
Excepts 170      .00      .247         .433 .00         1.00 
Dirsha 170      .571      .135          .179  .00           .75 
Subinst  170      .3990      .389          .177  .00           .80 
Audit 170      .00      .477          .501  .00         1.00 
Proned 170      .40      .410          .140  .00           .78 
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 Table 4: OLS Regression Results 
Number of obs = 170; F =30.292; Prob> 0.000; R2 = 0.630; Adj R2 .609; MSE = .09404;  
Durbin Watson = 1.808 
Source SS df MS 
Model 
Residual 
Total 
2.411 
1.415 
3.826 
    9 
160 
169 
.268 
.009 
 
Cncs      Coef. Std err      t-value          Sig           95%Con. Interval  
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
     VIF 
(Constant) -.2140 .064 -3.360 .001 -.340 -.088
Size .0302 .005 6.451 .000 .021 .039 1.358
Gear .1790 .037 4.817 .000 .106 .252 1.149
Profit .4570 .071 6.402 .000 .316 .598 1.069
Liquid .0680 .010 6.983 .000 .049 .087 1.060
Excepts .0412 .017 2.403 .017 .007 .075 1.051
Dirsha .0016 .046 .034 .973 -.089 .092 1.274
Subinst .106 .043 2.452 .015 .021 .192 1.124
Audit -.0004 .015 -.025 .980 -.030 .029 1.054
Proned .0420 .054 .780 .436 -.064 .148 1.082
Mean VIF                                                                                                                                   1.136 
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 Table 3: Pearson Correlations Between Company Characteristics and Narrative Discussion Index    
 Cncs Assets Gear Profit Liquid Excepts Dirsha Subinst Audit Proned 
Cncs  1.000          
Assets    .528**  1.000         
Gear    .440**    .276**      1.000        
Profit    .445**    .148      .198*    1.000       
Liquid    .431**    .140      .026      .072    1.000      
Exceps    .090    .019      .015     -.045     -.083    1.000     
Dirsha   -.226**   -.374**     -.067     -.100     -.047      .030  1.000    
Subinst    .203**   -.038      .133       .049      .137     -.019   -.206**     1.000   
Audit    .008   -.083      .017       .090      .041     -.137   -.048       .098     1.000  
Proned    .097   .158*      .057      -.023     -.059      .160*   -.160*     -.033      -.098    1.000 
** = Pearson Coefficient of correlation is significant at 1% level (2-tailed). * = Pearson Correlation is significant at 5% level 
(2-tailed). 
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